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 naicsmarG A :tnempoleveD nevenU nainarI dna tnempoleveD esenapaJ
 evitcepsreP
 tcartsbA
 detabed neeb sah srewop nretseW lairepmi yb detanimod yltnacfiingis dna depolevedrednu si narI yhW
 dna seirutnec ht02 ylrae/ht91 etal eht ni esir s’napaJ .yrutnec a naht erom rof slautcelletni nainarI gnoma
 pu hctac ot redro ni wollof thgim narI taht ledom a fo gnihtemos ti edam 5-4091 ni aissuR fo taefed sti
 dna larebil yllaitnesse neeb evah siht no sucof hcihw sehcaorppA .dlrow tsilatipac depoleved eht htiw
 nainarI fo noitseuq eht enimaxe-er ot si yduts tnerruc eht fo mia ehT .erutan ni ”larutluc“
 stoor lacirotsih/lairetam dna stxetnoc lautca eht erapmoc ot egatireh s’icsmarG gnisu ,tnempolevedrednu
 suonegidni esenapaJ eht tseggus ot ,si tahT .tnempolevedrednu nainarI dna tnempoleved esenapaJ fo
 ,revewoH .srewop lairepmi ngierof yb detpurretni yltnacfiingis ton saw yrtnuoc eht poleved ot emmargorp
 erew sadnega evissergorp rieht dna scolb lacirotsih elpitlum fo ecnegreme eht ,esac nainarI eht ni
 morf ,dna aissuR ,niatirB yleman ,srewop lairepmi gnitanimod eht yb detaefed dna detpurretni yldetaeper
 fo sesac lacirotsih owt eht neewteb nosirapmoc ehT .setatS detinU eht ,sdrawno yrutnec ht02-dim eht
 tnempoleved eht gnipahs ni elor laicurc a deyalp metsys cimonoce labolg eht taht etacidni napaJ dna narI
 .narI fo tnempolevedrednu/tnempoleved nevenu eht dna napaJ fo
 :چکیده
. شد ایرانی محافل وارد بیستم قرن آغاز از ژاپن چون کشوری توسعهیافتن مقابل در ایران عقبماندگی چرایی
 با ایران مقایسه راه بود، داده شکست نوزدهم قرن امتداد در را ایران بارها درحالیکه ژاپن از تزاری روسیه شکست
 ایران توسعهنیافتن چرایی تحلیل برای« فرهنگی» گرایشات. کرد باز ایران داخل پژوهشهای درمیان را ژاپن کشور
 به یافتن دست برای بررسی این در جهت این از. است غالب بسیار ایرانی پژوهشهای میان در ژاپن با درمقایسه
 ایران ماندگی عقب چرایی دنبال به رویکرد این در. آوردهایم روی توسعه انتقادی رویکردهای به دقیقتر تحلیلی
 آنتونیو ایتالیایی مارکسیست اندیشمند توسط که« عقیم انقلاب»  و« تاریخی بلوک» مفاهیم اساس بر ژاپن با درمقایسه
« مشروطه انقلاب» و ژاپن در« میجی اصلاحات» تاریخی مهم برهه دو بررسی با. کردهایم تکیه اند شده مطرح گرمشی
 در مشروطه جنبش شدن عقیم به منجر انگلستان و روسیه امپریالیستی دخالتهای چگونه که گفت خواهیم ایران در
 در توانست ژاپن چگونه خارجی موثر دخالتهای غیاب در درمقابل و شد گرفته، شکل تاریخی بلوک یک عنوان به ایران
 بهصورتی را خود هژمونی شد قادر چگونه شکلگرفته بلوک و برد پیش را خویش بومی توسعه میجی انقلاب قالب
 ژاپن کشور کمک به خود هژمونی تثبیت راستای در آمریکایی جهانی نظم دوم جهانی جنگ از پس. کند تثبیت نوین
 شکل تاریخی بلوک مقابل در اما. گردد دوباره رشد و جنگ های ویرانی بازسازی به قادر ژاپن شد موجب و شتافت
 و انگلستان قدرت دو هژمونیک دخالتهای قربانی مصدق محمد رهبری به نفت صنعت کردن ملی برای ایران در گرفته
 بیستم قرن امتداد در دوباره کمونیسم با مبارزه نام به ایران مترقی نیروهای حذف و مرداد ۸۲ کودتای با و شد آمریکا
 به ایران جایگاه از ساختاری تحلیل این فرهنگی و لیبرال تحلیلهای برخلاف درواقع. شد دچار« عقیم» سرنوشت به
 . دارد را ایران عقبماندگی چرایی به پاسخ توانایی که است جهان در ژاپن مرکزیت درمقابل حاشیهای کشور یک عنوان
 گرمشی آنتونیو, جهانی نظم هژمونی، عقیم، انقلاب تاریخی، بلوک ماندگی، عقب توسعه، ژاپن، ایران،: کلیدواژهها
 sdrowyeK
 icsmarG ,msilairepmI ,ynomegeH ,napaJ ,narI ,tnempoleveD nevenU ,tnempoleveD
 4/3ssi/3lov/icsmarg/ua.ude.wou.or//:sptth :lanruoJ icsmarG lanoitanretnI ni elbaliava si elcitra lanruoj sihT
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1. Introduction 
Debates on why Iran is economically, socially and politically 
relatively under-developed have occupied a significant part of 
mainstream Iranian discourse during the twentieth and early 21st 
centuries. Japan, on the other hand, as a developed and powerful 
Asian State, has occupied an important place in the Iranian 
literature and debate on development. This was particularly true 
after its defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5. The 
Japanese victory over Russia contrasted sharply with Iran’s loss of 
some 250,000 square kilometres of its northern territories to 
Russian forces in the early 19th century and its subordination to 
Russian power until the early 20th century. 
However, similar to most of the discourse which has linked 
underdevelopment in Iran to problems arising from Iranian culture, 
the dominant debate among Iranian scholars about the Japanese 
model has taken a “cultural approach”. That is, the Japanese were 
able to achieve a developed economy because they had a “culture” 
more amenable to supporting such development, compared to the 
Iranians. Therefore, it is common to find Iranian-based studies that 
highlight education, religion, tradition, individual characteristics and 
so on as main factors behind Japanese development. Take, for 
instance, a recent study on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s economic 
policies and recent “development” in Japan (Yari and Bayazidi, 
2017, pp. 65-84). In this article, factors such as “loyalty of the 
individuals to the Emperor and the State”, “individual justice”, and 
Japanese “respect and politeness” have been taken as elements 
behind development. An alternative approach suggests that 
“societies act based on their thoughts [culture] not in accordance 
with their material resources” (Naqi Zadeh 2005, p. 28). Therefore, 
Confucian thinking, nationalism and the borrowing of Western 
ideas are depicted as being at the heart of Japanese development 
and giving it “moral supremacy over the rest of the Asian nations” 
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(ibid., p. 44). These two examples are part of a broader liberal 
umbrella which dominates current Iranian economic-political 
discourse. 
The domination of liberal and cultural approaches in economic-
political debates in Iran also indicate the underdevelopment of 
critical studies in this regard. The current paper, therefore, attempts 
to emphasise the importance of critical studies by offering a 
comparison between Iran and Japan based on two periods: that of 
the late 1800s/early 1900s and then the period following WWII. As 
part of developing a critical approach, the paper incorporates into 
its framework some important ideas derived from Gramsci. 
First, we shed light on two historical developments that led to 
the emergence and re-emergence of Japan as a developed capitalist 
and imperial power in the second half of the 19th century and after 
the Second World War, when it recovered quickly from its defeat 
and devastation by the United States and its allies. The Iranian case 
will be examined based on the same historical periods. We argue 
that, in the case of Japan, the progressive transition (revolution) was 
not retarded by foreign and imperial powers and therefore was 
successful in establishing a modern and highly developed capitalist 
hegemony. Even in the post-WW II period, the United States 
hegemonic interest did not retard Japanese development – indeed, 
it helped facilitate the modernization of the political system and 
revive and further develop the country. This was mainly due to the 
need to establish successful capitalist bulwarks against the spread of 
communism in Asia, especially after the 1949 Chinese revolution. 
In contrast, the attempts at progressive transitions, led by multiple 
organic social forces, in Iran met the fate of “passive revolutions” 
in both the early 20th century and post-WW II periods. These were 
mainly due to interventions of imperial forces such as Britain and 
Russia, and later the United States (US), which, based on their own 
imperial interests, changed the course of Iranian history. Under-
development in Iran, therefore, owes its existence to the country’s 
subordination to imperial powers, as a peripheral country, rather 
than to its “culture”.  
 
2. Development in Japan and Uneven Development in Iran 
Before they become the intellectual discourse of the Iranian 
bourgeoisie, cultural approaches to understanding underdevelop-
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ment in this country are ideologically imported from the hegemonic 
Western powers. The famous perspective of Orientalism, suggested 
by Edward Said, is classic in this regard. Said pursued the root of 
this perspective which depicts the inferiority of Eastern cultures vis-
a-vis the supremacy of Western culture from the late eighteenth 
century and the first colonial contact of the French with Egypt 
(Said 2003). In a recent study, Govand Azeez examines the Western 
historical framing of Middle Eastern revolutions and progressive 
transitions from Al-Mahdi’s revolution in the second half of the 
19th century to the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Azeez finds that these 
movements were depicted as “illiberal”, “undemocratic” and 
“Islamist” and eventually “regressive” rather than “progress-
ive”(Azeez 2014 pp. 64-86). Therefore, there seems to be no 
positive-sum game assumed by the West for the problematic culture of 
peripheral Middle Eastern States. Whether static or in a movement 
towards a revolution, Middle Eastern culture is the main factor 
behind Middle Eastern underdevelopment. 
Moreover, approaches such as that suggested by Harvard 
historian David Landes are also popular among the proponents of 
the cultural approach in Iran. The key solution that Landes 
proposes to the developing States is to amend their culture, based 
on the successful Western model, in order to achieve and enjoy the 
same development that the First World capitalist States enjoy 
(Landes 1998). Therefore, based on Landes’ theoretical framework, 
those nations which have not yet achieved development either have 
not copied the Western model or they have not copied it enough. 
The characteristics of the cultural approach can be seen as sub-
branches of what Robert Cox has named “problem-solving 
theories”.1 Accordingly, the cultural approach is reductionist, given 
that it reduces the complexity of some 200 years of British, Russian 
and American hegemony over the Iranian socio-economic and 
political structure, and the impact and the uneven development that 
this hegemony leaves behind, to mere local culture. Therefore, the 
cultural approach is ahistorical in method and lacking in overall 
context. Its positivist criteria simply does not work when subjected 
to structural and critical examination. To remain within the critical 
                                                            
1 For a debate on the characteristics of Problem-Solving Theories as opposed to Critical 
Theories, see Cox 1981, pp. 126-55. 
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framework suggested by Cox, the cultural approach is the ideology 
of the status quo for maintaining the status quo (ibid).2 
The main issue with the pro-status quo approaches in relation to 
Iran is that they do not offer a perspective by which the under-
development in this society can be comprehended. In a sense, the 
cultural approaches constitute an epistemological dead-end in 
Iranian development-related discourse. This is precisely where the 
intervention of critical theory can also be understood as providing 
an epistemological balance. To fulfil such a task, we build upon 
Antonio Gramsci’s thought to offer a theoretical model in which 
both Japanese development and Iranian underdevelopment can be 
comprehended. 
Gramsci’s name is most famously associated with the term 
“hegemony”. However, it is the process of achieving hegemony or 
the failure of such achievement that provides a perspective in which 
different kinds of States, their development and underdevelopment 
can be comprehended. Gramsci depicted two political structures, 
rather superstructures, in the modern era. One is a hegemonic 
structure in which the ruling élite rely primarily on consent as a 
means to rule, while the other is a non-hegemonic structure which 
survives mainly through coercive means.3 The first kind of States 
are the capitalist developed, or First World, States; the other are the 
underdeveloped peripheral, or Third World, States (Cox 1983, pp. 
162-75). 
Hegemony is a dialectical product of clashes between social 
forces and the superstructure of a specific society. To quote Augelli 
and Murphy, “It should be clear that in employing Gramsci’s theory 
to analyse IR (international relations) we are forced to learn a great 
deal about society” (Augelli and Murphy 1993 p. 138). The dynamic 
of the clashes between society and its superstructure takes place 
within, and through the leadership of, a historical bloc.4 Gramsci 
                                                            
2 Ibid. 
3 Given his special circumstances – being in a Fascist prison – Gramsci reflected on the two 
different kinds of States in fragmented writing. For a detailed historical discussion in this 
regard, see: Gramsci, 1971, pp. 123-205 (i.e. the section based largely on the “special” 
Notebook 13 on Machiavelli, with additions from elsewhere in the Notebooks – editorial note). 
4 Our use of the term “historical bloc” here goes beyond a mere alliance of ‘social forces’ and 
should not therefore be confused as the outcome merely of negotiations and alliances of pol-
itical forces around a specific political goal or programme. Rather, it is the collision between 
the structure and superstructure that is meant as an overall context in which social forces, 
classes and alliances lead a specific progressive transition toward a new era which 
fundamentally changes the State as it used to be known. 
International Gramsci Journal No. 11 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Winter /Inverno 2019   
 
 
7 
 
noted that material needs and common causes bring together dif-
ferent social forces – for instance, the economic élite, the intelli-
gentsia, the religious, the urban poor and the peasantry – under a 
common banner toward a progressive transition (Gramsci 1971, pp. 
123-205).5 This Gramscian theorization of revolution, as it can be 
observed in developed States, succeeds when a historical bloc leads 
a progressive transition, ends a period of historical stagnation and 
builds its hegemony over the ruins of the old regime. The trans-
formation of England from a feudal to a capitalist political power 
structure, initially through the civil war between monarchy and 
parliament in the 1640s and the French Revolution in 1789 are 
examples of historical blocs that successfully led a progressive 
transition toward establishing new hegemony for new ruling élites.  
As will be discussed, the Japanese historical bloc in the late 19th 
century and its transition to industrial capitalism will be viewed as a 
successful establishment of a new hegemony. Yet the same thing 
cannot be said about peripheral States; their new, modernizing 
historical blocs fail to accomplish a progressive transition and 
therefore are unable to replace old regimes with their own 
hegemony (Gramsci 1971, p. 105; [original] Gramsci 1975, Q15§59, 
pp. 1822-3). In this part of the world, otherwise known as the 
Global Periphery,6 we witness the underdevelopment which 
resulted from capitalist development in the Global Core. One way 
to implement this dynamic is to undermine the progressive 
transitions which are undertaken in the Global Periphery by the 
Core States. The dramatic fate of “passive revolution”, to use 
Gramsci’s term, is a feature of uneven development in the Global 
Periphery (Gramsci 1971 p. 59; Gramsci 1975, Q19§24, p. 2011). 
Nineteenth-century Italy and the Risorgimento reformist 
movements were Gramsci’s own examples for passive revolution.  
Gramsci argued that the Risorgimento was so predominantly 
influenced by the French Revolution at the level of ideas that its 
historical bloc was distorted: it attracted intellectuals but lacked 
other vital social forces such as an organic economic élite (Gramsci 
pp. 116-7: Gramsci 1975, Q10II§61, p. 1360). In the current study 
we view the Iranian historical blocs in the early and mid-20th 
                                                            
5 See footnote 3 (above). 
6 In the 1960s and 1970s, these countries were often referred to as the Third World because of 
their position at the bottom of the global pecking order. The term was not pejorative; indeed, 
it was usually used by partisans of these countries and their liberation movements. 
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century as attempted progressive transitions which were defeated 
by the British, Russian and then American imperial powers and 
eventually became converted into passive revolutions. 
Gramsci’s ideas have attracted much attention in multi-disciplin-
ary fields of studies, most notably the International Political Econ-
omy school which came to be known as the neo-Gramscian school. 
In this regard, Robert Cox suggested a Gramscian model in which 
hegemony can be understood beyond national borders and at a 
global level. As we learn from Cox, the established hegemony in an 
industrial capitalist State such as Britain surpasses the national 
boundaries to globally serve the interests of the British ruling élites 
through the establishment of global hegemony. A global hegemonic 
power would need to shape a world order, and the coercive-consent 
process of making sure that other States follow, in order to main-
tain hegemony (Cox 1983). The sphere of hegemony includes allies 
and alliances which have their own vested interests to advance via 
agreeing to participate in the world order and maintaining it by 
accepting the role of the hegemon (Cox 1987, p. 215). This is an 
additional theoretical framework to realize the development of a 
State such as Japan in relation to either its own organically-
developed capitalism or in alliance with the hegemon, and therefore 
beneficial to hegemony, as was the case in the post-WW II period, 
especially at the height of the Cold War. The absence of such a 
privilege for the majority of the peripheral States in a specific world 
order also helps explain continuing underdevelopment in States 
such as Iran. 
Accordingly, both Iran and Japan function within and are 
affected by the same international system, but in totally different way. 
It is this historical materialist perspective, as Adam Morton reminds 
his readers, that is at the core of the Gramscian perspective which 
views history as always a “world history” in which the part is 
affected (whether positively or negatively) by the whole.7 Our 
analysis therefore sees uneven development in Iran as a result of 
international political and economic relations and capitalist 
development in imperial States such as Britain, Russia and the 
United States. 
 
                                                            
7 For the notion of uneven development in Gramsci’s work and its use to analyse the dynamic 
of the Global North-Global South relationship, see Morton 2007, pp. 2-7. 
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3. Japan  
3a. The country in the nineteenth century 
A century after European expansion into the Americas and the 
emergence of a colonial mode of accumulation, Japan was subject 
to a civil war in the late 16th century. As a result, the Ashikaga 
shogunate8 regime was replaced by the Tokugawa shogunate 
(Frédéric 2002, p. 978). The latter was in charge of the Japanese 
feudal system, although with loose and decentralized control, for 
over two centuries. The Japanese social structure in this period 
encompassed the feudal lords who were closely linked to, and 
traditional allies of, the Tokugawa ruling élites; the Samurai, who 
constituted a military and warrior caste; and the peasantry, who 
were viewed suspiciously by the other three social groups. The 
peasants, for instance, would not be incorporated into the military 
force, out of the fear that they might become powerful enough to 
challenge the establishment (Kennon 2012, p. 18). However, by the 
mid-19th century, the liberal world order and its economic system 
both began to make their presence felt in Japan. 
By the 1850s, Japan was subject to pressure from Western 
imperial forces active in Asian waters, most notably the USA, to 
open up for trade. The Japanese accepted the 1854 Treaty of 
Kanagawa which was imposed by the US to grant the latter trade 
concessions (Hunter 1999, p. 5). Ironically, the US ended Japanese 
isolationism while itself having a conscious and sophisticated 
protectionist economic regime. Agreements between Japan and 
other European powers such as Britain, Russia and the Netherland 
followed the US-Japanese treaty (ibid.). By the end of the 1850s the 
weakness of the Japanese ruling élite and their subordination to 
Western powers was accompanied by a fear of peasant rebellion. 
Various disadvantaged social groups emerged within a historical 
bloc to spark a revolution in 1868, the Meiji Restoration. The 
Emperor Meiji was supported by part of the ruling élite which were 
in opposition to the previous order. The Samurai, who at this stage 
were shifting from their military role to becoming entrepreneurs, 
supported the Meiji industrialization policy (Rajabzade, p. 25). The 
peasants too became de facto supporters of the Meiji revolution. 
They were subject to exploitation for mostly agricultural production 
                                                            
8 A title granted by the Emperor to a military governor which was common in the Japanese 
administration system.  
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during the Tokugawa era and were kept marginalized by the feudal 
élite.9 Similar to Iran in 1906, which will be discussed below, the 
Japanese historical bloc succeeded in establishing a new govern-
ment. However, unlike the Iranian case, the Japanese government 
also succeeded in leading the progressive transition in Japan. 
Accordingly, from ending feudalism to leading investment in areas 
such as railways, mines, shipping and textiles, the Japanese govern-
ment paved the way for the emergence of industrial capitalism 
(Stearns 1993, pp. 113-29). Therefore, the Japanese historical bloc, 
in the Gramscian sense, succeeded in establishing its hegemony. 
Japan escaped the fate of being reduced to a peripheral State and, 
by the beginning of the 20th century, was establishing itself as a 
major power. 
While Japan was briefly dominated by the capitalist forces of the 
global economic system, unlike the entire Middle East or China10 it 
was never taken over by foreign powers or, like Iran, indirectly 
colonized. This also means that the logic of the dialectical evolution 
and transition from primitive economy to feudal and from there to 
capitalist economy was not disturbed or disrupted in the Japanese 
case. In the words of Gramsci when commenting on the Japanese 
intellectuals, “In Japan we have a formation of the English and 
German type [of intellectuals], that is an industrial civilization that 
develops within a feudal-bureaucratic integument with unmistak-
able features of its own” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 22-3: original Gramsci 
1975, Q12§1, p. 1529). To refer to categories used by Alexander 
Gerschenkron, Japan introduced a government-led approach to 
capitalism in the 19th century. While the British model involved the 
emergence of an organic capitalist élite and the German-Austrian 
approach relied on banks to finance the emergence of industrial 
capitalism, the Japanese, and to some extent the pre-1917 Russian 
model as well, relied on conscious / planned governmental 
programmes to develop a capitalist industrial base (Gerschenkron 
1965). These developments provided the background for the 
Russo-Japanese war in 1904. 
                                                            
9 For the Japanese peasants as an object of suspicion for the feudal élite, see Kennon 2012. 
10 Japan also observed the European powers and the US humiliating and exploiting China and 
were determined to escape that fate. While these powers were busy in China, Japan had a 
window of opportunity to modernize economically and even became one of the powers 
picking apart China.  
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Japan emerged as an imperial power and a Core State, partic-
ularly within East Asia, with its victory over China in 1894-95 and 
Russia in 1904-05. With its territorial expansion into China and 
Korea on the Asian mainland, Japan became a directly colonial 
power as well (Smith 1998, pp. 41-2). By the Second World War it 
was a major global power and a key protagonist. 
 
 
3b. The Re-emergence of Japan 
Similar reasons to the ones that allowed the emergence of Japan 
as an industrial and military power in the second half of the 19th 
century contributed to its re-emergence as a major economic power 
in the post-WWII / Cold War era. Japan did not face major external 
resistance to the Meiji Restoration and the policy of industrializ-
ation. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, the imperatives of US 
global hegemony led successive American governments to rebuild 
capitalist Japan (Panitch and Gindin 2012, pp. 203-4). This runs 
totally contrary to the treatment that peripheral States such as Iran 
have received at the hands of the major western powers. 
The Second World War changed inter-State relations and most 
notably formally ended British hegemony. The new US institutional 
power ‘to take the helm in a project for making capitalism global’ 
was shaping the post-WWII world while most of its allies and rivals 
(especially Britain, France, Japan and Germany) had been 
substantially weakened by the war (Panitch and Gindin 2012, p. 7). 
The rise of the American hegemony differed from its earlier British 
counterpart, partially in its reliance on multilateralism.11 This meant 
that multiple international organizations were to be established and 
installed in key roles by the US as mechanisms of its hegemony (cf. 
Cox 1981). These included the World Bank (July 1945), United 
Nations (1945) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Decem-
ber 1945. Multilateral cooperation within the above-mentioned 
mechanisms of hegemony was mainly among capitalist allies. The 
apex of the ‘American rescue of the European capitalist States’ in a 
pathway toward a hegemonic bloc based on American leadership 
was the Marshall Plan of 1948. Mostly indebted to the US even 
before WWII, and devastated as the result of that war, the 
European allies would not be able to recover without America’s 
                                                            
11 For a more in-depth discussion, see Gill 1990, pp. 90-5. 
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financial support. To quote Keynes on post-WWII Britain, ‘our 
post-war domestic policies are impossible without American 
assistance’. Japan was included in the rescue pack. 
Apart from building a new capitalist global economy, the 
American-led Western bloc was also meant to isolate the Soviet 
Union – and, after 1949, China. The hegemonic alliance was also 
successful in overcoming the effects of the pre-WWII Great 
Depression. The recovery of global capitalism was celebrated by 
another multilateral alliance, namely the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) founded in 1960, also to 
help ensure US hegemony (Cox 1987, p. 216). This included 
Canada and Japan – the latter having already benefited from a 
rebuild package parallel to the Marshall Plan. The new economic 
order was so beneficial and crucial to the re-emergence of the US 
capitalists’ allies that they willingly accepted US hegemony rather 
than a real partnership. 
The Japanese route to re-emergence involved various stages in 
which the United States played the role of a subsidizer. Japan joined 
the World Bank in 1952 and soon became the biggest debtor client 
after India. Between 1946 and 1950 the US provided $1.95 billion 
in aid packs to Japan to prevent shortages in food and other 
essential goods. In these years, the Japanese economy was heavily 
reliant internally on State subsidies and externally on American aid 
(Halliday 1976, pp. 29-30). This aid to the Japanese economy 
continued; until 1970 US investment in Japan was 6.5 times larger 
than Japanese investment in the US (Halliday 1976, pp. 264-5). 
Accordingly, even after the massive destruction of Japan in WWII, 
the absence of pacifying elements on the one hand and the positive 
role of the very element (imperial foreign forces) that retarded and 
distorted development in Iran contributed to the re-emergence of 
Japan as a developed capitalist economy.  
 
 
4. Iran 
4a. The Constitutional ‘Passive’ Revolution 
Iran owes its title of a “peripheral State” to when it was first 
incorporated into the global economic system in the early 19th 
century. Over a century of military defeat and humiliation, semi-
feudal economic stagnation, dysfunctional and rather decentralized 
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government and famine inherently resulting from the Iranian 
political-economic subordination to the British and Russian 
imperial forces became the platform for the emergence of an 
Iranian historical bloc in the late 19th century. The movement 
sparked by this historical bloc is widely known as the Constitutional 
Revolution which formally succeeded in establishing a parliament in 
1906. Reflecting on the diversity of the social forces and compon-
ents of this Iranian historical bloc Janet Afary states:  
 
The Constitutional Revolution was made possible through an initial hybrid 
coalition of forces, which included liberal reformers, members of the ulama 
[the clergy], merchants, shopkeepers, students, trade guildspeople, workers, 
and radical members of secret societies who promoted the formation of an 
assembly of delegates and a constitution (Afary 1994, p. 21). 
  
The Constitutional Revolution is also the first modern Iranian 
movement in which women participated, protesting against the 
status quo along with the men (Abrahaman 2015, p. 57). The 
Revolution eventually forced the monarch, Muzafaraldin, to sign a 
constitution that would limit the absolute powers of himself and his 
heir and create a democratically-elected government in 1906. 
The Iranian attempt at a progressive transition was soon com-
promised, however, by the two dominant imperial forces, namely 
Britain and Russia. The process of pacifying the Constitutional 
Revolution started just a few months later when Iran was divided 
into two areas of influence by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 
1907 (Abrahamian 2010, p. 98). As a result, the new Iranian parlia-
ment was bombarded by Russian artillery, newspapers were banned, 
250 people were killed and some of those arrested were executed 
without trial (Foran 2013, pp. 292-5). In short, Iran was punished 
for doing something that the British had just achieved through the 
civil war of the 1640s, the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 and then 
the extension of the franchise for men in the mid-1800s – demo-
cracy, at least for men, and the removal of absolute monarchy. 
The revolutionists fought back, but unsuccessfully. The years 
between 1906 and 1911 were years of social mobilization in an 
effort to restore the Parliament. However, the second Parliament 
was dissolved by an ultimatum jointly issued by Russia and Britain. 
A massacre of the revolutionists followed the dissolution of the 
Parliament in 1911, thus the slogan of “independence or death”, 
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became prominent for decades to come (Abrahamian 1982, p. 109). 
Given the role of imperial British and Russian forces in Iran, the 
Constitutional Revolution became a passive revolution in 1911 and 
this tragedy led to a decade of political instability and conflict, social 
disintegration, famine and finally the emergence of a Bonapartist 
modernizer, or what Gramsci refers to as Caesarism, namely Reza 
Khan, later Reza Shah, in the 1920s. 
 
 
4b. The American World Order and the Impact on Iran  
Contrary to Japan, the post-WWII passive revolution in Iran set 
off another wave of uneven (under)development in the country. Un-
like Japan, Iran had a neutral position in WWII, although this did 
not prevent an alliance of the United States, Britain and the Soviet 
Union from occupying it in 1941. Different motivations inspired 
the different States involved in this violent occupation. Britain 
wanted to send troops to directly protect the oil it was exploiting in 
Southern Iran, oil which played a crucial role for the British in the 
war (Foran 2013, pp. 406-7). The US aimed at using the recently-
built Iranian railroad and other infrastructure to aid the Soviets 
fighting the Germans. Similar to the Russian tsars, Stalin was divid-
ed between claiming the Iranian territories which the Red Army 
occupied in Northern Iran, establishing secessionist proxies to fight 
for the Soviets, and claiming oil concessions granted by the Iranian 
government in 1947 (Bose 1972, p. 2). The occupation itself in 
1941 put an end to Reza Shah’s project of indigenous nation-State 
building, modernization and industrialization.12 Accordingly, the 
Shah was forced to abdicate and sent into exile by the occupation 
forces, and his 18-year-old son was installed as the next monarch. 
The Caesarism of Reza Shah was itself a product of an historical 
bloc which had been defeated and pacified by the occupying imper-
ial forces in 1941. However, the years between 1950 and 1953 
witnessed the emergence of another historical bloc in Iran to lead 
the process of progressive transition. The highly exploitative nature 
                                                            
12 Reza Shah can, in many senses, be compared to the Viceroy Mohamed Ali in Egypt and his 
modernizing project in the early 19th century. Samir Amin considers Mohamed Ali’s pro-
gramme of development to be the first in ‘the periphery of globalised capitalism’, predating 
those of Japan and China. Amin also concludes that the root of the Egyptian failure in this 
period must be sought in “foreign aggression by Great Britain” which officially occupied 
Egypt in 1882 after years of domination. See Amin 2016, pp. 21-2.  
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of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was a source of con-
cern for all Iranian governments after the discovery of oil by the 
British subject William Knox D’Arcy in the South (Reguer 1982, p. 
134). However, it was under the leadership of the National Front, 
which worked as an umbrella to contain various nationalist and 
leftist political groups and parties along with the clergy to support 
the elected Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh, that Iran’s 
struggle with AIOC developed.13 Backed by both the Parliament 
and the National Front, Mossadegh declared Iranian oil to be 
national property and stopped AIOC operations in the country 
after the latter refused to negotiate a better deal that took Iranian 
concerns into account. Seeing the decline of British hegemony and 
the rise of American power, the Iranian government even proposed 
a partnership with the US, based on similar enterprises between 
American corporations and the Saudis (Siavoshi 1994, pp. 106-34). 
What distinguished American corporations such as Standard Oil of 
California, which were already partners with the AIOC, from the 
British corporations was that the Americans were willing to share 
50 percent of the oil revenue with producing States such as Saudi 
Arabia and Venezuela.  
Mossadegh and the historical bloc of the early 1950s were 
betrayed by the Americans who acted alongside their British part-
ners. Over a period of six months, the CIA and MI6 prepared a 
coup which removed Mossadegh from office on August 19, 1953.14 
Once more in the 20th century, an Iranian progressive transition was 
turned into passive revolution by the hegemonic imperial forces – 
in the first instance, Britain and Russia; in the second, the United 
States and Britain – in their own interests. Unsurprisingly, the 
defeat in 1953 also set the conditions for decades of uneven 
economic, social and political development, including the turmoil 
of 1979 which resulted in a theocratic regime.  
Iran had entered WWII with an occupation by the dominating 
imperial powers. There had been the beginning of a break, under 
the Mossadegh government, as post-war economic hardship drove 
the Mossadegh reforms, including the proposal to nationalize the 
oil industry. The 1953 coup ended the possibility of an alternative 
                                                            
13 For more in-depth discussion about the diversity of the social forces which supported the 
National Front, see Abrahamian 2018, pp. 210-17 (Farsi). 
14 For a detailed discussion of the coup which became known as Operation Ajax in CIA 
documents, see: Kinzer 2003, p. 2.  
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economic course and the rest of the 1950s amounted to years of 
economic stagnation. There was certainly consistent American 
economic aid to Iran, estimated to be $366.8 million for the period 
between 1953-57 (Richards 1975, pp 3-22, 24, 26.) but this was not 
at all similar to US economic aid and other help provided to Japan, 
a country which had more the status of a hegemonic partner. After all, 
the 1953 coup violently denied Iran the deal it needed to plan its 
own economy. Regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Iran were 
needed to be economically stable to help contain the Soviet Union 
in the Middle East during the Cold War. Saudi Arabia was also 
granted similar economic aid by the US and the UK during the 
1940s when the State witnessed a decline in the number of the 
pilgrims who were at that time the State’s main source of revenue 
(Cleveland and Bunton 2009, p. 233). The other – and less told – 
side of the story of Washington’s economic aid to Iran in the 1950s, 
however, was that the US, along with international organizations 
such as the World Bank, dictated a ‘comprehensive national 
development plan’ to Iranian governments and the CIA checked 
almost every media outlet and educational programme in Iranian 
schools to make sure that ‘American interests’ were met during the 
Cold War (Afshar 1981, pp. 1097-1108; Battle 2002). This was 
different to Japan, where the US needed a successful capitalist 
economic model to act as an ideological counter to China and its 
socialist model and their possible influence on newly-emerging 
independent Asian countries. If Japan failed to develop, other Asian 
countries could turn to a non-capitalist model. This was an import-
ant reason that the US thus did not economically plunder/exploit 
Japan the way it did Iran. After the Korean War, it also became 
important for the US to assist the economic development of South 
Korea as an alternative to the North Korean economic model. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The liberal and cultural approaches which dominate the Iranian 
ideological debate in relation to development / underdevelopment 
are ahistorical, lack structural analysis of Iranian – and Japanese – 
society and, therefore, cannot be useful for understanding and 
explaining the backwardness of the Global Periphery countries, 
including Iran. The ambiguous and unclearly defined phenomenon 
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of culture can, moreover, be impacted by material conditions, in a 
historical context, and not vice versa. The element of culture is 
responsible for neither development nor underdevelopment. 
The methodological emphasis in this paper has been on the 
relevance of critical theory in understanding peripheral under-
development in comparison to the economic-political evolution of 
the developed core States. Accordingly, examining both Japan and 
Iran within a historical materialist context, we argued that Japanese 
development owes its success to the triumph, in the second half of 
the 19th century, of the historical bloc which was able to establish its 
hegemony, as defined by Gramsci. In contrast, the Iranian historical 
bloc within the same period was defeated by the dominant British 
and Russian imperial forces and turned into what Gramsci defined 
as passive revolution. The Japanese re-emergence after the Second 
World War was due to the positive role that the global hegemon, 
the United States, played to keep this State within the sphere of the 
capitalist hegemony via sophisticated and expensive programmes to 
rebuild Japan. This course was taken by the United States in order 
to preserve its hegemony in the face of the rise of a powerful 
opponent potential hegemon in Asia, namely communism. On the 
other hand, the Iranian historical bloc and its progressive transition 
faced a violent intervention, embodied in a military coup, from the 
same global hegemon after WWII. As a result, Japan can be 
classified as a developed capitalist State while Iran is still struggling 
with severe uneven development. 
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